How does Neopatrimonialism affect the African States Revenues? The case of Tax Collection in Zambia.

Abstract

Following the neopatrimonialism paradign, it can hypothesised that in African states informal politics of the rulers infringe on the collection of taxes and in turn reduce state revenue. This article tests this propositon for the case of Zambia. Neipatrimonialism continuity in the country is evidenced by three factors: the concentration of political power, the award of personal favours, and the misuse of state resources. Despite this continuity, the revenue performanced increased considerably with the creation of the semi-autonomous Zambia Revenue Authority. Donor pressure has been the most important intervening variable accounting for this improvement. Yet, strenghening the collection of central state revenue has been consistent with a neopatrimonial rationale, and may even have fed neopatriponialism overall, by providing increased resources for particularistic expenditure.