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Who Is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania

ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AGGREGATE SUPPLY AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY AGRICULTURAL SEASON AGRICULTURE ANTI-POVERTY ANTI-POVERTY INTERVENTIONS COFFEE GROWING REGION COMMUNITY COMMITTEES CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA CROP INCOME CROP PRODUCTION CROWDING OUT DECENTRALIZATION DESCRIPTION DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DISTRICTS ECOLOGICAL ZONES ECONOMIC CRITERIA ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELASTICITY EXTENSION AGENTS FARM ACTIVITIES FARMER FARMERS FARMING SEASON FEMALE FEMALE HEADED HOUSEHOLDS FEMALE PARTICIPATION FOOD POLICY FOOD PRICES FOOD PRODUCTION FOOD SECURITY FOOD-FOR-EDUCATION GENDER HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS HOUSEHOLD HEAD HOUSEHOLD HEAD AGE HOUSEHOLD HEADS HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD SIZE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD VULNERABILITY HOUSEHOLDS HOUSES ILLITERACY INCOME INCOME GROWTH INDICATORS FOR POVERTY INEQUALITY INSURANCE INSURANCE MARKETS IRRIGATION LABOR MARKETS LAND INEQUALITY LAND QUALITY LAND SIZE MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY MARKET FAILURES MARKET PLACE MULTIPLIER EFFECTS NATURAL RESOURCES NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT OCCUPATION OPPORTUNITY COST OPTIMAL TARGETING POOR POOR FARMERS POOR HOUSEHOLD POOR SMALLHOLDERS POVERTY ALLEVIATION POVERTY LINE POVERTY PROGRAMS POVERTY REDUCTION POVERTY STATUS PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS REGIONAL MEDIAN REGRESSION ANALYSIS REMOTE COMMUNITIES REMOTE VILLAGES RURAL RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE RURAL TOWNS SAFETY SAFETY NET SAFETY NET PROGRAMS SAFETY NETS SAVINGS SOCIAL COHESION TARGETED TRANSFERS TARGETING TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY VILLAGE ASSEMBLY VILLAGE LEADERS VILLAGE LEVEL YOUTH
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Africa | Africa | Sub-Saharan Africa | East Africa | Tanzania
2012-03-19T18:02:02Z | 2012-03-19T18:02:02Z | 2011-05-01

Input subsidy programs carry support as instruments to increase agricultural productivity, provided they are market-smart. This requires especially proper targeting to contain the fiscal pressure, with decentralized targeting of input vouchers currently the instrument of choice. Nonetheless, despite clear advantages in administrative costs, the fear of elite capture persists. These fears are borne out in the experience from the 2008 input voucher pilot program in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, examined here. Elected village officials received about 60 percent of the distributed vouchers, a factor that significantly reduced the targeting performance of the program, especially in more unequal and remote communities. When targeting the poor, greater coverage and a focus on high trust settings helped mitigate these concerns. The findings highlight the continuing need for scrutiny when relying on decentralized targeting. A clearer sense of purpose (increasing productivity among poorer farmers versus increasing aggregate output) could also enhance the targeting performance.

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