A key driver of Liberia's re-emergence from utter destruction, between 2004 and 2008, was the willingness of international actors to accept the responsibility and risks associated with stabilization. This was accomplished by confronting these risks directly, even at the cost of temporarily filling institutional voids and sharing sovereignty with the Liberian transitional authorities. The main international diplomatic representations and aid agencies on the ground came to accept from their varying perspectives that peace in Liberia was fragile and that the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (ACPA) of September 2003 was only the beginning of a protracted stabilization effort. The domestic market for consultants and goods did not exist, requiring the World Bank to innovate with new modes of delivering assistance. Thus, peace consolidation compelled international partners to simultaneously (i) prevent full state capture by corrupt elites in advance of elections and (ii) secure a peace dividend to vulnerable groups which could most directly threaten peace (young ex-combatants and refugees). Building on a solid UN-World Bank partnership, the international community found the internal consensus to address each of the two complementary peace consolidation challenges, adopting two highly innovative instruments: (i) an anti-corruption scheme labeled Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), involving such robust measures as expatriate co-signing authority, and (ii) a short-term employment-generation scheme now known as roads-with- United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), centered on a rare direct collaboration between the Bank and the engineering units of the UN's military peacekeeping force on the ground. This paper examines these two instruments more closely, in their successes and failures as well as from the perspective of temporary shared sovereignty and co-production.