Decentralization in Cameroon is an instrument to meet multiple objectives. This report takes stock of Cameroon s experience with decentralization. It examines whether the design has been coherently formulated and preconditions for decentralization have been put in place. It also suggests short to medium-term proposals to make the process work better, within the constraints of significant data limitations. The design of the decentralization process in Cameroon reflects the normative approaches to decentralization-assuming benign officials and policy makers, and stipulating a normative allocation of responsibilities. In reality, a political economy story is at play, as suggested by developments in the positive literature that drop the assumption of disinterested officials. The legal framework relating to decentralization is overlapping, cumbersome and contradictory, and in many respects open to different interpretations. The main difficulty is that decentralized functions are ill-defined and not distinct from deconcentrated operations of the central government. This report examines the building blocks of the decentralization framework-starting in chapter one with a description of the status quo and the methods to be used. In chapter two discuss the unclear legal framework in Cameroon. The fuzzy spending responsibilities and lack of effective strategy to address the extent and scope of decentralization are examined in chapter three. The weaknesses in information flows and public financial management (PFM) issues, including in the budgeting, treasury and debt management systems are addressed in chapter four. Examine in chapter five the absence of effective own-source revenues that limits the accountability of local governments. This accentuates a general absence of hard budget constraints at the sub national level. In chapter six review some options for redesigning the transfer system, and some institutional arrangements. Finally, in chapter seven address the special issues related to forestry.