Skip navigation
IMF Working Papers
2010
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

This paper builds on recent research by Fender and Mitchell (2009) who show that if financial institutions securitize loans, retaining an interest in the equity tranche does not always induce the securitizer to diligently screen borrowers ex ante. We first determine the conditions under which this scenario becomes binding and further illustrate the implications for...

0
1
0
0
IMF Working Papers
2010
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

This paper builds on recent research by Fender and Mitchell (2009) who show that if financial institutions securitize loans, retaining an interest in the equity tranche does not always induce the securitizer to diligently screen borrowers ex ante. We first determine the conditions under which this scenario becomes binding and further illustrate the implications for...

0
4
0
0
IMF Working Papers
2010
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

This paper builds on recent research by Fender and Mitchell (2009) who show that if financial institutions securitize loans, retaining an interest in the equity tranche does not always induce the securitizer to diligently screen borrowers ex ante. We first determine the conditions under which this scenario becomes binding and further illustrate the implications for...

0
2
0
0
Publications & Research :: Working Paper
World Bank, Washington DC
0
5
0
0
Publications & Research :: Working Paper
World Bank, Washington, DC
0
3
0
0