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IMF Working Papers
2008
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

This note, prepared ahead of the G20 Summit (November 15), builds upon the points laid out in the Managing Director’s letter to the Heads of State and Government (November 9). It lays out two tasks ahead for policy makers. Policies for now should cover:(i)implementing and coordinating policies to sustain demand; (ii) providing liquidity support to emerging economie...

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27
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IMF Working Papers
2008
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

This note, prepared ahead of the G20 Summit (November 15), builds upon the points laid out in the Managing Director’s letter to the Heads of State and Government (November 9). It lays out two tasks ahead for policy makers. Policies for now should cover:(i)implementing and coordinating policies to sustain demand; (ii) providing liquidity support to emerging economie...

0
26
0
0
IMF Working Papers
2008
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

This note, prepared ahead of the G20 Summit (November 15), builds upon the points laid out in the Managing Director’s letter to the Heads of State and Government (November 9). It lays out two tasks ahead for policy makers. Policies for now should cover:(i)implementing and coordinating policies to sustain demand; (ii) providing liquidity support to emerging economie...

0
26
0
0
IMF Working Papers
2008
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring p...

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37
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0
IMF Working Papers
2008
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring p...

0
26
0
0
IMF Working Papers
2008
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring p...

0
30
0
0