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IMF Working Papers
2007
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

How do signatures required for exporting and business registration procedures affect the volume and composition of country's exports? To answer this question, I develop a model where a country can export two types of products: differentiated and homogeneous. I show that export signatures and registration procedures reduce overall exports by increasing transaction c...

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IMF Working Papers
2007
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

How do signatures required for exporting and business registration procedures affect the volume and composition of country's exports? To answer this question, I develop a model where a country can export two types of products: differentiated and homogeneous. I show that export signatures and registration procedures reduce overall exports by increasing transaction c...

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IMF Working Papers
2007
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

How do signatures required for exporting and business registration procedures affect the volume and composition of country's exports? To answer this question, I develop a model where a country can export two types of products: differentiated and homogeneous. I show that export signatures and registration procedures reduce overall exports by increasing transaction c...

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Publications & Research :: Publication
Washington, DC
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Publications & Research :: Working Paper
Washington, DC
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IMF Working Papers
2008
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

We derive non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (NE) importer and exporter petroleum excise taxes given full within-group tax coordination, but no coordination between groups, assuming that importers do not produce and exporters do not consume petroleum, and petroleum consumption causes a global externality. The aggregate NE tax is found to consist of an externality com...

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IMF Working Papers
2008
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

We derive non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (NE) importer and exporter petroleum excise taxes given full within-group tax coordination, but no coordination between groups, assuming that importers do not produce and exporters do not consume petroleum, and petroleum consumption causes a global externality. The aggregate NE tax is found to consist of an externality com...

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1
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0
IMF Working Papers
2008
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

We derive non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (NE) importer and exporter petroleum excise taxes given full within-group tax coordination, but no coordination between groups, assuming that importers do not produce and exporters do not consume petroleum, and petroleum consumption causes a global externality. The aggregate NE tax is found to consist of an externality com...

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